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There has been a growing literature in both the US (for example Haurin and Brasington 1996, and Black 
1999) and the UK (for example Gibbons & Machin, 2001), which estimates the way in which school 
quality is capitalised into house prices. In earlier work the present authors (Cheshire & Sheppard 1995; 
1999) estimated a hedonic model for the housing markets of Darlington, Nottingham and Reading in the 
UK in which the quality of the secondary school to which a household was assigned was a significant 
variable. The more recent work measured secondary school quality using a continuous measure of exam 
success. This provided evidence that the value of secondary school quality was being capitalised into the 
price of houses. 
 
In contrast Gibbons and Machin concluded that primary schools had an identifiable and significant price 
associated with their quality but that secondary schools did not. Their study did not have data for 
individual houses but used post-code sector data and then various techniques to standardise for all but 
one variable: either the notional primary school catchment area or the notional secondary school 
catchment area.  
 
All of these analyses are predicated on the assumption that the value of local schools should be reflected 
in the value of houses. We expect variation in the capitalised price of a given school quality at either 
primary or secondary level according to the elasticity of supply of ￿school quality￿ in the local market. 
This will vary systematically between and even within cities and this paper explores the sources and 
impact  of such variations. 
 
Using an hedonic model and data from 1999-2000, we estimate values attached to both secondary school 
and primary school quality in the Reading housing market.  The results support the conclusion that both 
secondary and primary school quality is capitalised into the market price of houses and that the 
capitalisation of school quality is discounted within the highly constrained city of Reading in areas where 
new construction is concentrated . We also find evidence that appropriate model specification is 
imperative since bias is evident both when key neighbourhood characteristics are omitted and if the 





Concern over the quality of local schools, and over the variation in this quality, has drawn the attention of 
parents, policy makers and scholars. For many households, there is a single path to access quality 
education: identify an acceptable quality state-supported school and purchase a house in the area served 
by that school. Households lacking the means to take up residence in such areas will face reduced 
educational opportunities, and that fact continues to generate controversy. 
 
Interest in these issues has a long history. For economists, it goes back at least to Tiebout (1956) and 
Oates (1969). The questions they addressed were how do we determine the demand for and supply of 
local public goods, including education, and how do we pay for such goods. It was Oates who first drew 
attention to the ways in which the value of local public goods were capitalised in urban land markets. 
From this many implications flow including the role that land markets play in articulating social 
segregation (see for example, Brueckner, Thisse and Zenou, 1999) and the interaction this will have with 
the distribution of incomes (see for example Cheshire, Monastiriotis and Sheppard, 2000) and the supply 
characteristics of local public goods and amenities. In this paper we explore the extent of capitalisation of 
educational quality into house prices, and examine how this might be affected by land use planning 
policies. 
 
At least three methodological approaches can be distinguished in the literature concerned with estimating 
the value placed on school quality. The longest established is a straightforward hedonic approach of 
which the other two are variants. The hedonic approach has some 80 years of evolutionary development 
behind it since agricultural economists first implemented it as a purely empirical technique to help 
identify the characteristics of vegetables commanding the highest price. Since Rosen￿s 1974 contribution 
it has become one of the standard techniques for analysing the price of complex goods, particularly that of 
housing.   
 
Over the past 25 years a great many new insights have been gained particularly as to the importance of 
model specification and the way in which the values of local neighbourhood characteristics, local public 
goods and locationally specific amenities are capitalised into land values. In parallel there have been 
important technical innovations in the effort to capture these effects more precisely. Perhaps the single 
                                                 
1 We would like to thank the Leverhulme Foundation for its support for the work underlying this paper.   4 
most important lesson that has been learned is the most obvious: the value of any house varies 
systematically and substantially with its location and these location-specific factors are at least as 
important as the characteristics of the structure itself in determining market price.  
 
Because the relationship between market price and characteristics is typically non-linear, the specification 
of hedonic models is critical in determining the prices estimated for individual characteristics. Poorly 
specified models can yield misleading results. For example, the values of omitted locationally specific 
characteristics tend to be attributed to the estimated price of space, either internal space in the house or 
land area. Most of the value in the market price of urban land is in fact represented by the capitalised 
value of locationally specific goods. These include the quality of local schools. 
 
This may underlie the concerns that have led researchers recently to search for other ways of isolating the 
values attached to particular local public goods (or other spatially determined amenities). Both the 
methods deployed in the recent literature on the value of schools are essentially variants of hedonic 
analysis. Black (1999) sought to isolate the value placed on school quality by taking a large sample of 
house values for which she could reasonably argue that the only difference between them was the quality 
of the schools to which they gave access. In so far as this was correct then it followed that one could 
attribute differences in their value to differences in school quality.  
 
This ￿matched pair￿ method is really a type of hedonic analysis. It is implicitly admitted that many 
variables or attributes determine the price paid for the complex good housing and the researcher is simply 
trying to set up a situation in which the influence of all but one is eliminated. A difficulty with the 
approach is that there are no obvious tests to apply to see to what extent the research design has 
succeeded. In so far as there are omitted spatially fixed effects which are correlated with the school 
districts then there would be bias in the estimated value assigned to schools. In a fully specified hedonic 
model however we can (and should) undertake tests of model specification.  
 
Gibbons and Machin (2001) develop another variant on hedonic analysis. They employ a kernel-based 
technique to try to offset for spatial fixed effects and exploit the co-variation in house prices and school 
performance within narrowly defined spatial units to reduce the need for a large set of covariates.  They 
use mean house prices by area and deviations from means. There are some potential problems with this 
approach. One relates to the characteristics of supply which, as is discussed below, will vary from city to   5 
city and under some circumstances, will vary systematically by location within cities reflecting the quite 
local elasticity of supply of housing (the implications of which are explored by Hilber and Mayer 2001). 
Thus the resulting estimates will be, at best, mean values for the whole area analysed (in the case of 
Gibbons and Machin, England and Wales) and may conceal very large variation between areas. Indeed it 
is perfectly possible that in a British context, in some areas primary school quality is expensive (mainly 
because it is in inelastic supply) whereas in others, secondary school quality is expensive.  
 
A second problem with this approach is really the same as the criticism of Black￿s matched pairs 
approach made above. While one may design the technique to control for spatially fixed effects ￿ such as 
neighbourhood characteristics, other local public goods and specific locationally fixed amenities ￿ we 
cannot test for the extent to which one has succeeded. Some of these locationally fixed effects are very 
local (for example views, access to local amenities, local disamenities from industrial land use, noise 
disturbance or the socio-economic characteristics of the neighbourhood). Since the catchment areas of 
primary schools are small, any failure to fully account for spatially fixed effects will tend to be reflected 
in the value of the estimated parameter for primary school quality. Sorting processes in housing markets 
concentrate socio-economic groups whose children do better in the educational system in precisely the 
same areas, giving a double boost or upward bias to the estimated value of primary school quality. 
 
For these reasons we use a traditional hedonic approach and attempt to measure a wide range of local 
neighbourhood characteristics, including the socio-economic composition of the neighbourhood and other 
local public goods and localised amenities. We have also included the most fundamental of all features of 
the structure of urban land markets ￿ land consumption and accessibility to jobs. 
 
2. Considerations of supply 
 
There remains the important issue of supply. Demand and the willingness to pay for school quality may 
not vary greatly from one city to another, at least within the same country, but its price may vary because 
of variation in the supply of school quality available to a household living at a specific address. This can 
vary substantially from one city to another. An important source of such variation will be institutional 
differences, including land use regulation. If in one location the supply of houses is fixed whilst it is 
highly elastic in another, then the measured impact of capitalisation of school quality vary even though 
demand is invariant. This implies the possibility of local variation in the implicit price of school quality. 
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Even restricting attention to a single country with a common educational and planning system, we should 
expect substantial differences in the supply characteristics of school quality between cities. Rather less 
obviously there may be differences in the supply of school quality within cities, especially in larger ones, 
because of differing elasticities of supply of housing according to location. In previous work (Cheshire 
and Sheppard, 1995) we have identified substantial differences in the degree of planning restriction on 
housing supply between cities that corresponded with differences in the capitalised price of secondary 
schools.  
 
In the present paper we focus on the particular case of Reading, England. The data set is discussed in the 
next section but it is important to consider the detailed factors that will influence the supply of school 
quality within the urban area. First, of all English cities, it is one of the most tightly restricted by growth 
boundaries. Thus there is likely to be a relatively inelastic supply of housing in the whole area but housing 
supply will vary from location to location as particular parcels of land are released. 
 
It is a relatively high-income community, well endowed with private schools, particularly at secondary level. 
This suggests there is likely to be an upper limit on the capitalised price of school quality. Access to private 
schooling is controlled largely by income not location, so if a given degree of school quality can always be 
purchased in the private market for educational services, this price will determine the upper limit of the 
capitalised value of state secondary school quality. Access to high quality public schools (in Reading) is 
tightly rationed by location. At the primary school level (i.e. for children below the age of 11) there are in 
addition state-funded parochial schools, admission to which is more loosely related to home address. 
 
Table 1: Success rate of Appeals against School Allocation and per Appeal 
Authority  Primary Schools  Secondary Schools 


















England  1.7 31.0 1.6 29.0 1.3 25.4 1.5 28.5 1.8 23.3 2.0 23.5 2.3 23.5 2.0 23.4 
Reading Area
3 1.6 31.4 3.7 31.2 1.7 17.3 2.3 26.6 0.4  7.5  0.6 15.6 0.5  9.6  0.5 10.9 
Inner  London  1.5 16.0 1.2 15.1 0.6  8.9  1.1 13.3 1.8 15.0 1.7  9.3  1.6  8.3  2.1 10.9 
Gtr.  London  2.7 23.6 2.1 20.3 1.3 15.7 2.0 19.9 2.2 13.9 2.2 11.9 2.7 13.3 2.4 13.0 
Oxfordshire  1.3 43.0 1.6 47.6 1.2 42.4 1.4 44.3 1.5 38.4 2.1 45.4 1.5 33.3 1.7 39.0 
Darlington  7.1 44.9 8.8 40.7 6.0 41.5 7.3 42.4 4.1 34.3 4.7 37.1 2.5 31.6 3.8 34.3 
Nottingham  0.4 30.3 0.8 28.4 1.4 35.2 0.9 31.3 0.5 21.7 0.8 17.6 1.0 23.7 0.8 21.0 
Manchester  2.2 28.0 2.8 38.7 1.7 25.7 2.2 30.8 1.2 14.7 2.1 24.1 2.1 18.2 1.8 19.0 
Cheshire  0.1 27.5 0.7 69.2 0.7 51.3 0.5 49.3 0.5 62.7 2.0 59.3 3.9 65.0 2.1 62.3 
1Successful Appeals as % of Total Admissions 
2Successful Appeals as % of Total Appeals 
3Weighted mean for three 
Local Education Authorities: weights determined by distribution of sampled houses 
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In addition to private and parochial schools, a further option that might limit the extent of capitalisation of 
school quality into house prices is the possibility that a household is granted permission to send their 
children to a state-supported school other than the one to which the house would usually be allocated. 
Essentially, one must be concerned with the overall ￿porosity￿ of school catchment zones. This will be 
determined by a combination of factors. Each house is assigned to a default primary and secondary 
school. Parents may in principle nominate any school for their child but presumably there is considerable 
inertia: most parents simply accept the local school. However the likelihood of parents nominating a 
different school to the local one will be partly determined by their perception of the probability of such a 
nomination being successful. If they choose a school other than their default school and the local 
education authority (LEA) do not accept this choice then parents may appeal. Again it is likely that in 
deciding whether to appeal parents take some account of the probability of success since the appeal 
process takes some time and effort.  
 
In trying to compare differences in the underlying ￿porosity￿ ￿ the probability that a child living at a 
particular address will actually attend the local default school in the catchment area of which the house is 
located ￿ we are hampered by only being able to observe some of the relevant variables.  There are no 
data on the proportion of parents choosing a non-local school nor on the proportion of such choices which 
are rejected by the LEA. Since 1997, however, there are systematic data on the appeals process. Figures 
are published for all LEAs in England on the total number of admissions to primary and secondary 
schools, on the number of appeals against the allocations made by parents and the outcome of these 
appeals. Some of these data are summarised in Table 1.  
 
Patterns are reasonably consistent between LEAs: Darlington has a high rate of successful appeals; 
Cheshire has a low rate relative to admissions but a high proportion of the appeals that there are, are 
successful (perhaps indicating a very flexible policy with a high rate of unobserved nominations of non-
local schools as well); Inner London has a low rate of both successful appeals relative to admissions and 
relative to appeals. This may reasonably be interpreted as indicating an inflexible regime in which the 
school a child attends is largely determined by home address. The data for Reading suggest a regime 
which is rather less restrictive that that of Inner London at the primary level but even more restrictive at 
the secondary level. Looking at the mean rates for the three years only 0.5 percent of children successfully 
appeal against their secondary school allocation in the Reading area (one quarter the success rate of Inner 
London or England as a whole) and 10 percent of appeals are successful ￿ the same as Inner London but   8 
half the proportion of England and one sixth that of Cheshire. A further feature of the Reading area (from 
discussions with LEA officials) and one which may characterise other areas which seek to steer children 
to their ￿local￿ school is that boundaries are revised on a regular basis to try to fill available school places 
and eliminate spare capacity. The evidence, therefore, strongly supports the conclusion that in Reading 
most children go to the school determined by the location of their home and the precise boundaries of the 
catchment areas in force in the year they first go to either primary (at 5 years) or secondary school (at 11) 
but that this probability is significantly higher at the secondary school level and is very high by the 
standards of England as a whole.  
 
A second and unusual feature of Reading￿s school system is the continued existence of Grammar Schools 
(secondary schools with entry highly selective according to tested academic ability). It is possible that this 
means that as well as a price cut-off determined by the price of private schooling, there is also a quality 
cut-off in terms of capitalised values. Parents of very high ability children who expect them to get into the 
local Grammar School might be unwilling to pay for school quality by moving to the catchment area of a 
better, non-selective school, since they expect their child to get into the Grammar School. There might 
thus be an apparent drop off of school quality-price at the highest level of measured output quality. 
 
Let us summarise the way in which we conceptualise the elasticity of supply of school quality (or at least 
supply as measured by those variables we are using to capture it) in Reading. If parents are concerned to 
increase the probability of their child(ren) attaining a particular level of qualification then their choice at 
the primary level will be between: a secular state primary, a parochial school (which as argued by 
Gibbons and Machin 2001 may have a cost associated with it of conforming to religious requirements) or 
a private school. If they choose a state school then they can move to the catchment area of the school of 
their choice, trading off price against quality; or they can try to obtain entry to a more distant school, 
probably a parochial one, and pay a price in the journey to school and church. De facto there is more 
flexibility (that is an ability to exercise choice of school) at primary than at secondary school level. These 
considerations suggest the supply of school quality at primary level may be more elastic than it is at the 
secondary school level. 
 
A second feature of primary schools however is that there may be a significant distance decay effect with 
respect to school quality. The cost of sending a child to a more distant primary school is substantially 
higher than sending a child to a more distant secondary school. Children younger than 10 or 11 will   9 
normally be taken to school by a parent. Secondary school children will usually travel to school on their 
own. Thus there may be a distance cost associated with primary school quality although their catchment 
areas may be small enough for this not to be significant. We might anticipate a distance decay effect of 
the price of primary school quality because a better school is better the nearer it is to home.   
 
At the secondary level parents can make similar choices except that in Reading there is a strong constraint 
against choosing any secondary school (subject to minor qualification in the case of Catholics or 
Muslims) other than the one in the catchment area of which you live. However unlike the situation in the 
US, where school district boundaries tend to be stable, in Reading boundaries of catchment areas are 
deliberately revised annually.  
 
How are these restrictions on choice affected by the land use planning regulations? Development controls 
in Reading effectively impose a non-price constraint on housing supply and make that supply more 
inelastic. In the most extreme case, the effective supply of houses in any school￿s catchment area would 
be given by the existing stock. In this situation, we would expect to see complete capitalisation of the 
value of educational quality into house prices.  
 
Recent analysis by Hilber and Mayer (2001) has drawn attention to the fact that the extent of 
capitalisation is reduced in areas where the supply is more elastic. Comparing across cities in 
Massachusetts, they find empirical support for the observation. It is possible that such reduced 
capitalisation might exist also in those portions of an urban area where land has been released by the 
planning system and new house construction is allowed although any discount observed may also be 
attributed to uncertainty about the quality of school a child will attend (because of larger and more 
frequent changes in the boundaries of catchment areas and uncertain composition of the schools) rather 
than purely localised differences in elasticity of supply. Finally, if such a discount in the price of school 
quality is observed it could be due to a land use planning system that works to concentrate new 
construction in localities with significant local disamenities which are difficult to measure and control for 
in the hedonic model. In this case any apparent discounting of school quality might in part or whole 
reflect the spatial concentration of such omitted variables. 
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3. Data and Setting 
 
Our data are drawn from the urban area of Reading, England. The city is located on the Thames about 35 
miles west of central London. Reading is subject to considerable pressure for growth and residential 
development, and in response has adopted some of the most restrictive planning policies in England and 
Wales. With frequent high-speed rail links to London, proximity to Heathrow airport and other locational 
advantages the area has attracted a number of high technology firms
2 and more generally follows the 
development patterns typical of prosperous, middle-size cities of the southeast of England. Despite its 
proximity to London, Reading is a major employment centre with more than 85 percent of its employed 
residents working locally and a strong central business district employment concentration. It is a 
reasonable city, therefore, to which to apply the familiar monocentric model of urban land use. 
 
In 1991 the city had a metro area population of approximately 337000 persons comprising 129000 
households. At the time of the 1999/2000 survey we estimate that there were 131370 households. Our 
initial sample of properties comprised over 870 separate structures. This provided a sample of 
approximately 20% of the residential properties offered for sale by major estate agents during the 17 
months covered by the data.  Complete data including location, structure characteristics, sales date and 
price, and school assignments were available for 490 observations and these are used in the analysis 
below. 
 
Supplemental information on land use was assembled from Ordnance Survey resources and aerial 
photographs. Data on both secondary and primary school catchment areas was obtained from the local 
education authorities. Data on state-supported school quality were obtained from the Department of 
Education website
3. The measure used for primary schools was the performance of its pupils on the Key 
Stage 2 tests
4. For secondary schools the measure of school quality was the proportion of pupils obtaining 
5 or more passes at grade C or better in GCSE
5. Data on the availability, performance and price of local 
private schools was obtained from the ISIS website. The Department of Local Government, Transport and 
the Regions￿ (DETR) index of employment deprivation was used as the measure of the socio-economic 
                                                 
2 Microsoft, Oracle, Hewlett-Packard and others 
3 http://www.dfes.gov.uk/statistics/DB/SBU/b0333/index.html 
4 Tests administered nationwide and designed to assess achievement in mastering that portion of the national curriculum, 
known as ￿Key Stage 2￿, deemed appropriate for ages 7 to 11. 
5 A nationwide exam taken at minimum school leaving age, 16.   11 
characteristics of the neighbourhood. Appendix Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for the 
sample and description of each variable used in the analysis. 
 
4.  The Hedonic Model 
 
Our basic model follows the principles set out in Cheshire and Sheppard 1995 & 1998. We locate each 
house in the sample and measure the size of the plot of land associated with it. We then estimate a 
modified linear Box-Cox hedonic price function given in equation (1). Note that the value function for 
urban residential land, specified in equation (2), is estimated directly as part of the hedonic price function. 
The land rent is ￿monotonic￿ only in the sense that it is radially symmetric: land value must increase or 
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set of indices of characteristics which are continuously variable 






land rent function defined below 
 
 
and the land rent function is given by: 
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sin ,  (2) 
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where:    
x  =  Distance from the city centre 
θ  =  Angle of deflection from the city centre 
n  =  Number of ￿ridges￿ in land value, representing radial asymmetries 
βi  =  Estimated parameters of land value function 
 
Searching over a small grid (1-4) it was determined that a rent function with n=3 ridges provided the best 
fit to the data. The estimated land value depends on the location and also the size of the plot and type of 
structure built upon it. For a structure matching the sample mean in all attributes (except location) the 
spatial structure of the land value function is illustrated below in Figures 1 and 2. The surface is viewed 
from the southeast looking towards the northwest. The three ridges closely track the local transport 
system. They are aligned with the main road access routes to the city centre: the A329M linking the main 
London Bristol motorway ￿ the M4 ￿ to the centre from its eastern junction; the access route from the M4 
at its junction to the south of the city along the A33; and the main route, again linking to the M4, to the 




















Figure 1 ￿ Plot of land value per acre  Figure 2 ￿ Land value with projected contours 
 
The measure of the value of land shown in Figures 1 and 2 is essentially the price of ￿land as pure space 
with accessibility￿. Actual market prices of vacant land include the capitalized value of all the local 
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access. As was shown in Cheshire and Sheppard 1998 these amenity values may exceed the value of land 




5.  Interpreting the results 
 
We present the results of estimation of six models. Parameter estimates for the reported models are 
presented in Appendix Table 2. Model I presents estimates of a basic model including measures of the 
quality of the primary and secondary schools to which the address is assigned by the local education 
authority. Model II presents an estimate of the same model, but using the quality measures of the primary 
and secondary school that are nearest (straight-line distance) to the house. Model III presents a model 
using the measures of school quality at the assigned schools, but drops the DETR Employment 
Deprivation index
7, and Model IV repeats this structure using the school quality measures from the 
nearest schools. The last two models include all available variables plus an index for the house being 
located in an area of the urban periphery that has experienced considerable new construction. In Model V 
this index is included in a way that allows estimation of any discounting of the value of school quality for 
houses in these areas; in Model VI a simple dummy variable is incorporated if the house is located in a 
(peripheral) area within which new construction has been concentrated.  
 
A. Value of Primary and Secondary Schools 
 
We start by addressing the question: which types of schools are of greater value to purchasers of houses? 
There are at least two different approaches to this question, and it turns out (at least with the data sample 
used for this analysis) that each approach gives a somewhat different answer. 
 
The first approach is simply to compare the estimated hedonic prices of each measure of school quality. 
Examination of the parameter estimates in Appendix Table 2 shows immediately that the estimated 
parameter for the quality of secondary schools is considerably larger than for primary schools (as well as 
having a larger t value associated with it). A better comparison is afforded if we standardize the ranges of 
the quality measures. Figure 3 presents plots of the hedonic price (in thousands of pounds
8) for both the 
                                                 
6 In the data studied in Cheshire and Sheppard (1998) the amenity values were greater by a factor of up to eight. 
7 Various of the available deprivation indices were tried. The multiple index of deprivation worked best in a statistical sense 
but, because one small element of that is the performance of the local primary school on Key Stage 2, the results obtained using 
the employment deprivation index are shown here. 
8 Evaluated for a house whose value and other characteristics are equal to sample mean values.   14 










measure of secondary school and primary 
school quality, standardized so that the 
movement from 0 to 1 represents the total 
possible range of outcomes in the quality 
measure. At comparable levels, the secondary 
school quality is ￿more valuable￿. It is notable 
how non-linear the price paid for school 
quality appears to be; better quality really only 
commands a substantial price in the top one 
third of the school quality distribution.  
 
An alternative approach is to ask which factor contributes the most to the value of houses within our 
sample. This question is different because of differences in the range of measured school qualities. The 
movement from the ￿best￿ to the ￿worst￿ secondary school within the area may be a much different 
proposition than the movement from the ￿best￿ to the ￿worst￿ primary school.  Indeed, this is confirmed by 
considering the change in value of an average house (a house with all characteristics set to sample mean 
values) as we move from the lowest to highest measured quality in the sample. Figures 4 and 5 provide 
one way of examining this issue. Each figure shows the variation in the predicted value of the average 
(bottom curve) and the most expensive (top curve) house in the sample as school quality varies from the 
lowest observed level to the maximum possible (the vertical axis in both cases is measured in thousands 
of pounds).  
 
Figure 4 ￿ Impact of primary school quality  Figure 5 ￿ Impact of secondary school quality 
Secondary School quality 












Figure 3 ￿ Comparison of price of quality 
Primary 
School 
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Figures 6 and 7 provide a visual representation of the joint impact of school quality of both types on the 
price of an ￿average￿ house, along with the distribution of observations in the sample within different 
ranges of the school quality spectrum. Figure 6 provides a surface that illustrates the impact on house 
values of changes in both primary (Key stage 2) and secondary (GCSE) school quality. Figure 7 
superimposes this surface over a ￿histogram￿ that shows the share of sample observations within each 
range of qualities.  It is apparent that the distribution of state-sector secondary schools is concentrated in 
the lower to middle quality range, while the distribution of state supported primary schools covers a 












Figure 6 ￿ Impact of quality on house price  Figure 7 ￿ Impact and distribution of quality on price 
 
In summary, while the hedonic price of secondary school quality is higher than the price of primary 
school quality, moving from the worst to the best possible secondary school would increase the value of 
the average house by £23,763 (or 18.7 percent of the value of a mean house). Moving from the worst to 
the best possible primary school would increase the value of the average house by £42,541 (33.5 percent 
of the mean house value). In passing it may be noted that the estimated value added to the price of a mean 
characteristics house moving it from the catchment area of the worst to the best secondary school from the 
1993 sample was an increase of 14.1 percent (Cheshire, Monastiriotis and Sheppard, 2000). The hedonic 
model used for the 1993 data did not include primary school quality since Key Stage 2 test results were 
not available then. 
 
B. Models With Measurement Error: Nearest vs. Assigned Schools 
 
Determination of the exact school that a child living in a particular house would by default attend is up to 
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education authorities can be difficult to obtain. For this reason many studies of the effects of school 
quality do not actually use the quality level of the assigned school, but rather the quality level of the 
school (primary or secondary) that is located nearest to the house. While this is feasible, a question 
remains concerning whether this provides a good approximation of the school quality that would actually 
be available to the residents of a particular house. 
 
Appendix Table 3 shows the correlations between school quality variables. It is immediately apparent that 
the correlation between the quality measures for assigned schools and closest schools is low. In the case 
of secondary schools which have larger catchment areas the R is only 0.435.  Comparing the estimated 
parameters for models I and II (shown in Appendix Table 2) we see that using quality measures for 
schools actually assigned to addresses provides a better fit for the data than using the values for the closest 
school. The t values for the relevant parameters fall and that for primary schools ceases to be significantly 
different from zero. 
 
These results suggest that caution is certainly appropriate when interpreting estimates based on 
measurement of school quality using the nearest school rather than the assigned school.  At least within 
the sample underlying the present analysis, the nearest school is at best a weak approximation of the 
school quality actually available to a child who attends the school designated for him or her by the local 
education authority. 
 
C. Quality of Schools and Neighbourhoods: Estimation With Omitted Variables 
 
A further concern in the evaluation of school quality arises because the school catchment area, 
particularly for primary schools, may serve as an approximation for local neighbourhood effects. 
Therefore omitted variables, particularly those related to neighbourhood quality, may bias the estimates of 
the value of educational quality and such estimates will reflect both the value of education and the value 
of the omitted neighbourhood variables. To examine this issue we examine the effect of model estimation 
when the DETR employment deprivation index variable is dropped from the model. This variable 
provides a measure of concentration in the neighbourhood (census ward) of persons having little success 
in the local labour market. It therefore helps to capture the socio-economic character of the 
neighbourhood. 
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Dropping the measure of the socio-economic character of the neighbourhood substantially increases the 
estimated value of the primary school parameter ￿ it increases sevenfold in absolute terms ￿ but because it 
impairs the overall performance of the model its t value is still lower than in Model I. The estimate for the 
secondary school parameter falls in absolute terms if the deprivation index is dropped, although it remains 
statistically significant. This provides support for the conclusion that there is likely to be an upward bias 
in the estimated impact of primary school quality on house prices if other important local neighbourhood 
effects are not independently controlled for. 
 
D. Discounting at the Urban Periphery: Planning for Growth or Uncertainty? 
 
Finally, we turn attention to the possibility that the value of educational quality is not fully capitalised into 
houses located at the urban periphery. As mentioned above, there are three potential reasons why this 
might . Under a very restrictive regime of land use regulation such as that observed in the Reading area 
there would be greater elasticity in the supply of developable land in those areas of the periphery subject 
to land release. This implies that some of the increased demand for housing is accommodated by increases 
in supply, so that the price need not rise by the full increase in consumer willingness to pay for access to 
high quality schools. On the other hand this would imply that in some sense the local housing market was 
in disequilibrium with residents able to ￿buy￿ a given level of school quality more cheaply in the areas of 
new construction than they could elsewhere. A second possibility is that the planning system operates in 
such a way as to concentrate new development in localities with disamenties not all of which are 
measured in the models.  
 
A third explanation, and the one that seems most plausible, arises due to the uncertainty regarding school 
quality in rapidly growing areas. This uncertainty arises from two sources. First, school quality is 
sensitive to both the quantity and quality of student intake. Both of these may exhibit considerable 
variance in peripheral areas experiencing rapid development. Therefore, house buyers may be uncertain as 
to the exact quality of schools that will be available to them. They would therefore discount the amount 
they would pay for school quality to reflect this risk. A second reason for discounting school quality in 
neighbourhoods where new development has been concentrated is the likelihood that the designation of 
school catchment areas will be subject to greater and more frequent change as the education authority 
seeks to equalise school intakes. 
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To see if such discounting appears to be present in Reading, we estimate two modified hedonic models. 


















































where all variables are as defined above, and in addition: 
βP  =  estimated parameter to capture the reduced impact of educational quality at the periphery 
δ  =  dichotomous variable indicating location in a peripheral area with new housing construction 
 
 
The second, Model VI, simply uses a dummy variable for houses located in peripheral areas of new 
construction. This allows us to test whether any discount strictly relates to school quality or just reflects 
unmeasured negative effects (disamenities) in such areas. Estimates of Model V show that there is indeed 
a strong discounting of school quality in wards where new construction was concentrated. Since this 
model clearly outperforms Model VI we can safely conclude that the discounting relates strictly to school 
quality not to the areas￿ amenity levels. This discounting is reflected in the variable βPeriphery, whose value 
indicates that for houses located in the peripheral areas of new construction the value of educational 
quality is discounted by more than 60% relative to houses in other portions of the city. This is a very large 
discount, and given the fabled restrictiveness of UK planning policies is unlikely to be entirely due to 
supply response. It seems plausible that this arises due to both uncertainty regarding future quality and 
supply response. Further research is required to isolate the separate contributions of each factor.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have sought to show that while average measures of the price of school quality estimated 
over many communities may be useful, because of local variation in the supply of school quality, one 
should expect that there would be substantial variation in the capitalized value of school quality between 
and even within cities. In addition we have highlighted what we see as the need to have as completely 
specified an hedonic model as possible if one is to obtain accurate measures of the capitalized value of 
school quality.  
 
Applying such an approach to the city of Reading in South East England for data relating to 1999/2000 
we find that the quality of both local secondary and primary schools was capitalized into house prices. 
The statistical significance of secondary schools was considerably greater as was the relative price that   19 
secondary school quality commanded. However there are far more primary schools and the range in their 
performance is considerably greater. Thus there was a larger total impact on house prices associated with 
￿moving￿ a standard house from the worst to best primary school catchment area than there was in the 
case of a similar move between secondary school catchment areas. The price paid for school quality was 
substantial and, in the case of secondary schools for which a direct comparison is possible, comparable to 
estimates for 1993 in the same housing market. 
 
Three further conclusions emerged from this analysis. The first was the need to include (at least in the 
context of Reading where children are assigned to schools according to their home address) the actual 
school catchment areas rather than the quality associated with the nearest school. Indeed there was only a 
low correlation between the quality measures for the two. The second is the danger of obtaining an 
upwardly biased measure of primary school quality if as full a range of local neighbourhood 
characteristics and amenities as possible is not included. Simply omitting the employment deprivation 
index for the local ward from the model increased the absolute value of the parameter estimate for 
primary school quality sevenfold (while reducing that of secondary schools). The third is that evidence 
was found that school quality measures are significantly discounted in areas in which new construction is 
concentrated. While this finding is consistent with the hypothesis of Hilber and Mayer (2001) that the 
elasticity of supply of housing will influence the extent to which school quality is reflected in house 
prices, both our findings and theirs are capable of other explanations. The discount might reflect 
uncertainty as to future changes in school catchment areas in such neighbourhoods or uncertainty as to 
what school quality will actually be since catchment areas and intakes are subject to greater change. Our 
results do show, however, that it is unlikely that the discount reflects the influence of omitted local 
disamenities from the model since it attaches strictly to school quality rather than to the area itself. The 
two plausible explanations are not mutually exclusive ￿ both could be true. An important goal of 
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Appendix Table 1: Variable Descriptions and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean  σ  Min Max  Description 
Price  126.9378 48.6852  45  385  Price in thousands of pounds 
Detached 0.0984  0.2981 0  1  1 if property is a detached house 
Semi-detached 0.1687 0.3748  0  1  1 if property is a semi-detached 
house 
Terrace 0.3896  0.4881 0  1  1 if property is a terrace house 
Townhouse 0.1024 0.3035  0  1  1 if property is a townhouse 
Parking 0.3153 0.4651 0  1  1 if property has off-street parking 
Thames 0.0080  0.0894  0  1 1 if centre of lot is within 150 m of 
Thames 
Rail 0.1104 0.3138 0  1 1 if centre of lot is within 200 m of 
rail line 
Cul-de-sac 0.2209  0.4153 0  1  1 if property is located on a cul-
de-sac 
Minor Road  0.6386  0.4809  0  1  1 if property is located on minor 
through street 
B-Road 0.0161 0.1258 0  1  1 if located on ￿B￿ class roadway 
A-Road 0.0482  0.2144 0  1  1 if located on ￿A￿ class roadway 
Time Trend  0.9351 0.3020  0  1.4740  Years since 6/1999 (time trend) 
Bedrooms 2.5815 0.8436  0  6  Number of bedrooms 
Baths  1.3448 0.6576  0  5  Number of bathrooms 
Nosquare 0.6103 0.1814 0.1854  1.0408  Ratio of lotsize to perimeter 
SqFt 676.1154 242.1323 189.8611  1749.0139  Square feet of internal living 
space in house 
Industry  10.6827  11.7065 0 50  Percent of land within 1 km 
square in industrial use 
EmployDepriv 7.0933  2.2435  2.4418  10.2846  DETR index of employment 
deprivation 
Lotsize 222.6534  214.7078 22.1088 2054.5471  Lotsize in square metres 
Distance 2289.1982 1462.9522 54.6539  8331.3380  Distance from town centre in 
metres 
θ -0.4863  2.0548  -3.1391 3.1391  Direction in radians from town 
centre (East=0) 
PrimarySchool   1.8654 0.4713  1.14 2.84  Sum of share of pupils in 
assigned school passing 
keystage 2 exams in English, 
Math, and Science 
SecondarySchool 0.3469  0.1390 0.1 0.75  Share of pupils in assigned 
school receiving a grade of C or 
better in 5 or more GCSE exams 
PrimarySchool   1.8457 0.4650  1.14 2.86  Sum of share of pupils in nearest 
school passing keystage 2 exams 
in English, Math, and Science 
(Models II and IV) 
SecondarySchool 0.3633  0.1356 0.05  0.72  Share of pupils in nearest school 
receiving a grade of C or better in 
5 or more GCSE subject exams 
(Models II and IV) 
Periphery 0.0944  0.2926  0  1 1 if Property located in peripheral 
ward with new construction 
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Appendix Table 2: Estimated parameters for Models I to VI, with t-statistics for each estimate. 
 
Parameter  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI 
β0 3.124553 3.236343 3.336312 3.29032  3.157533 3.  046134 
t  29.601 11.183 31.084 16.088 13.259  8.763 
βDetached 0.185303 0.201205 0.238915 0.224075 0.196929 0.206525 
t  8.469 4.751  12.608 6.321 4.472 3.551 
βSemi-detached 0.119002 0.134669 0.150193 0.14736 0.127006 0.133012 
t  6.800 4.798 9.395 6.204 4.311 3.062 
βTerrace 0.051215 0.054739 0.066083 0.058462 0.055034 0.056112 
t  4.195 3.517 5.544 4.425 3.284 2.705 
βTownhouse 0.07224  0.080601 0.084975 0.081427 0.077399 0.080087 
t  4.868 4.201 5.853 4.648 3.480 2.951 
βParking 0.011386 0.010764 0.01165 0.007322 0.011901 0.012787 
t  1.742 1.607 1.762 1.062 1.723 1.398 
βThames 0.074639  0.091209 0.09254  0.107257 0.077876 0.080634 
t  2.339 2.487 2.991 2.825 2.453 1.775 
βRail  -0.00837 -0.00985  -0.0076 -0.00957 -0.00899  -0.007828 
t  -0.949 -1.052 -0.855 -1.002 -0.990 -0.645 
βCul-de-sac 0.030018 0.03431 0.05332  0.050991 0.034378 0.035039 
t  2.265 2.234 4.197 3.389 2.447 1.821 
βMinor Rd. 0.005123 0.006463 0.019676 0.018172 0.008648 0.008621 
t  0.452 0.565 1.749 1.559 0.763 0.580 
βB-Road 0.099615 0.109639 0.139194 0.133493 0.110225 0.112372 
t  3.814 3.203 5.448 4.254 3.835 2.681 
βA-Road -0.0013 -0.00385  0.024584  0.011935 0.002416 -0.000335 
t  -0.071  -0.227 1.381 0.679 0.139  -0.0149 
βTimeTrend 0.029917 0.034401 0.037374 0.041336 0.030265 0.034544 
t  3.185 2.931 4.153 3.862 2.849 2.526 
βBedrooms 0.02032  0.024127 0.027871 0.025885 0.022862 0.020019 
t  3.031 2.955 3.939 3.619 2.578 1.710 
βBathrooms 0.051009 0.055213 0.061564 0.062694 0.054531 0.062154 
t  6.320 4.717 8.261 6.458 5.838 3.871 
βNotsquare 0.04914 0.052667 0.063436 0.053442 0.054138 0.053714 
t  2.848 2.469 3.579 2.745 2.567 1.973 
βSqFt  0.007772 0.005708 0.005827 0.007122 0.00716 0.015597 
t 18.951  6.457  21.543  10.140  7.592  4.733 
βIndustrialLand -0.00113 -0.0014 -0.00137 -0.00214 -0.00067  -0.000832 
t  -1.663 -2.071 -2.083 -2.780 -0.801 -0.758 
βEmployDepriv -0.02416 -0.02372      -0.0113 -0.016711 
t -5.899  -6.048      -4.836  -5.326 
β1 0.00766  0.009199 0.001622 0.001981 0.006044 0.005016 
t  1.352 4.447 5.059 1.577 1.221 1.587 
β2 -0.00095  -0.00097  -0.00141 -0.00108 -0.00099  -0.000917 
t  -3.148 -3.502 -2.349 -2.610 -3.756 -2.738 
β3 0.000516 0.000485 0.001067 0.000606 0.000541 0.000498 
t  1.953 2.190 1.724 1.647 2.210 1.745 
β4 -3.79069  -3.87525  -3.9581 -4.07902 -3.85198 -3.91983 
t  -23.445 -21.723 -21.876 -17.254 -23.113 -21.381 
βPrimarySchool 0.000836  0.000971 0.005957 0.002127 0.000593 0.003342 
t  2.461 1.384 1.854 1.656 2.694 2.732 
βSecondarySchool 0.588393  0.335556  0.474515 0.513499 0.278866  -0.339676   23 
Parameter  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI 
t  6.215 4.766 4.212 3.557 3.507  -1.152 
λ1 0.500048  0.551618 0.576605 0.531902 0.521684 0.419329 
t  24.429  9.681 48.943 13.406 10.544  6.311 
λ2 6.445736  6.508272  4.710182 6.026819 7.101111 4.938933 
t  11.943 8.204 7.628 8.719  15.255 5.554 
ξ 0.417822 0.425036  0.73667 0.737899 0.482328 0.531631 
t  2.257 4.063 9.434 5.473 3.633 4.067 
Ψ -0.14056 -0.1213 -0.09503 -0.10093 -0.12659 -0.111524 
t  -7.913 -2.794 -8.552 -3.568 -3.309 -2.156 
βPeriphery       - 0 . 6 0 186 -0.002997 
t       -1.925  -0.172 
σ 0.075256  0.082311 0.095002 0.092192 0.079578 0.085398 
  10.913 4.735  18.492 6.946 5.145 4.025 
Log Likelihood  -2103.11 -2101.9 -2110.45 -2109.55 -2097.26 -2096.95 
N  490 490 490 490 490 490 
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Price  1.000 0.138 0.182 0.202  0.215 0.089  0.142 -0.079 -0.146 
GCSE Assigned Secondary  1.000 0.435  0.450 0.409  0.163 0.203 0.264  0.168 
GCSE Closest Secondary    1.000 0.412 0.475  0.065  0.017 0.031 0.120 
Keystage2 Assigned Primary     1.000 0.815 0.137 0.104 0.095  -0.067 
Keystage2 Closest Primary      1.000 0.104 0.071 -0.006 -0.109 
Distance Assigned Primary        1.000 0.518 0.435  -0.069 
Distance Closest Primary          1.000 0.285  -0.007 
Distance Assigned Secondary           1.000 0.544 
Distance Closest Secondary              1.000 
 